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There have been of late years numerous treatises on special
branches and doctrines of the law, but until Mr. Reese's little
volume appeared no American had written a book on the doctrine
of ultra vires. Largely owing to the contradictory positions
assumed by the courts, and the illogical results often reached, the

subject is not altogether easy of brief, orderly and clear treatment,
especially when it is separated from the general law of corporations.
Mr. Reese is, therefore, doubtless entitled to the lenient judgment
of his readers.

In a little over three hundred pages of text, the writer considers
the application of the doctrine to the powers of private, quasipublic and municipal corporations. "The True Doctrine of
Ulra ires," it appears, is the "special capacities " doctrine,
which regards the corporation as restricted to the business and the
mode of its exercise indicated in its charter or the laws of its creation, and as possessing no power beyond those conferred. All
ultra vires acts, he believes, should be regarded as absolutely void
and of no effect. He attacks with force the illogical position of
those courts which, while nominally adhering to the special capacities doctrine, and declaring ultra vires contracts to be void, nevertheless, when they are executed permit a recovery upon the contract. The large number of cases marshalled to the support of the
writer's various propositions indicates extensive research. A few
important cases have been omitted, however, e. g., Wright v. Pie
Line Co., ioi Pa. 204 (1882); Insurance Co. v. AfcClelland,
9 Colo. II (1885); Slater Woolen Co. v. Lamb, 143 Mass. 420
(1887) ; Bath Gas Light Co. v. Claffy et al, 45 N. E. 390
(1896).

The view, which seems to be gaining ground, that a contract,
though ultra vires should be treated as enforcible interpartes, the

state exacting the proper penalty from the corporation, is not considered by Mr. Reese, except by inference in advocating a strict
adherence to the doctrine of special capacities. A feature of the
book is a chronological review of the doctrine as illustrated by the
cases. A number of the leading cases are synopsized and commented on. The synopses, while apparently generally accurate, are

not in all instances quite as exact as one might wish. For instance,
in the summary of Pearce v. Railroad, 231 How. 441 (I858),
reference is made to the fact that the note sued on was in
hands of a holder in good faith and for value, and that in
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States not even
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.importance of free circulation of commercial paper justified a
recovery on a note issued in payment of an ultra vires obligation,
though in the next case but one: Monument NationalBank v.
Globe Works, ioi Mass. 57 (1869), the circumstance that a recovery was permitted on a note given in excess of the powers of
the corporation and in the hands of an innocent purchaser for
value, is the only fact stated.
It is at least open to question whether apologetic matter, particularly when it has reference to style, should not be avoided. According to the preface, " In style and composition neither classical
precision, stilted phraseology, nor laborious effort at ' fine writing'
has been attempted." Observing incidentally that few legal writers
err on the side of precision, the presence of such paragraphs as the
following raises a doubt as to whether the author has quite realized
his aim of stylistic simplicity. "This uncertainty and confusion
[in construing corporate charters], however, has not arisen, it is
respectfully submitted, by reason of any misapprehension of the
correct construction which should be placed upon the doctrine, but
rather from a growing tendency of the courts of this country, a
spreading of the granger element in our state courts-to disregard
purely legal rights and the rules of law controlling them, unwisely
tempering their questionable judgments with even more questionable and unstrained mercy, and basing their findings upon the
equitable rights of the parties, whatever may be the cause of action,
as they appear to the particular court having jurisdiction of the
subject-matter, the application of the doctrine being dependent, in
a great measure, upon the temperament and discretion of the
judge before whom the defence of ultra vires is urged. While the
manner of adjusting legal complications may be commendable in a
certain sense, it cannot be regarded as judicial wisdom by those
who desire the fountains of legal jurisprudence maintained in all
their positive purity and vigor, undefiled by the wanton influence
of class prejudice, or the natural flow thereof diverged by the misguided inspiration of political zeal."
Walter C. Douglas, Jr.

